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Word Learning
Paul Bloom
Word learning is a controversial area,
but there are two facts that
everyone agrees about. The first is
that words really do have to be
learned. Regardless of how much of
conceptual structure and linguistic
knowledge is innate, the specific
links between sounds (or signs) and
meanings must be determined on
the basis of experience. No matter
how intelligent a British baby is, for
instance, she has to learn that dogs
are called ‘dogs’, that sleeping is
called ‘sleeping’, and so on. 
The second agreed-upon fact is
that children are strikingly good at
this sort of learning. Children utter
their first words by 12 months of
age, are relatively proficient at word
learning by 16–18 months, and
eventually come to learn new words
at a rate of well over ten new words
per day.
Children’s first words include
personal pronouns (me), proper
names (Mommy), prepositions (on),
adjectives (big), verbs (want), and
many classes of nouns, including
those referring to whole objects
(dog), substances (water), parts
(finger), habitual activities (nap), and
abstract notions (story). While
children sometimes get confused
about the precise meaning of word,
serious mistakes almost never occur.
This successful word learning
occurs even in conditions in which
children are not taught words in any
non-trivial sense, such as when
children are abused and neglected.
Minimal cues
Given how many words children
come to know (about 10,000 words
by age 6), one would expect them to
be able to learn words in very
minimal circumstances. This
expectation is born out by several
studies. For instance, children and
adults were exposed to a new word
in the context of a measuring game
with six novel objects. The word was
introduced in passing — ‘Let’s use
the koba to measure which is
longer… We can put the koba away
now’. Children weren’t asked to
repeat the new word and weren’t
tested to ensure that they heard it.
They were tested a full month later,
by bringing out the same objects and
asking them to ‘Show me the koba’.
Even 3-year-olds choose the correct
object over half of the time, far
better than chance. Furthermore,
there were no age differences —
3-year-olds did just as well as adults.
Further studies have found similar
abilities even in 2-year-olds.
The problem of word learning
What precisely is so impressive
about this ability? There is good
reason to believe that it is
impressive since, as far as we know,
no species others than humans can
learn words and certainly no
computer has ever been construed
that can do so. The problem of word
learning is surprisingly deep, and
the reason for this was most
famously demonstrated by the
philosopher W.V.O. Quine, who
gave the example of a linguist
witnessing a rabbit scurry by, and
hearing a native say ‘Gavagai’. It
turns out that there is an infinity of
logically possible meanings for this
new word gavagai. It could refer to
rabbits, but it could also refer to the
specific rabbit named by the native,
or to any mammal, or any animal, or
any object. It could refer to the top
half of the rabbit, or its outer
surface, or to rabbits but only those
that are scurrying; it could refer to
scurrying itself, or to white, or to
furriness. The linguist could
exclude some of these
interpretations through further
questioning and further experience
with the word, but some
interpretations are harder to
exclude. How could the linguist
know that the native isn’t using the
word gavagai to refer, not to rabbits,
but to time-slices of rabbits — to
entities that only exist for the
instant that the word is used? Or
that the native isn’t talking about, as
Quine puts it, ‘all and sundry
undetached parts of rabbits’?
Indeed, how could the linguist
know that gavagai is a name at all, as
opposed to the native clearing his
throat, or making a noise to warn the
animal away, or saying the
equivalent of ‘Look!’ or ‘I’m
bored!’.
Quine used this example to
defend a skeptical position about
language — that there really is no
such thing as the meaning of a word.
But contemporary scholars in word
learning have used it to support a
different moral: Since children do
solve these problems of reference
and generalization, this suggests
that they are somehow constrained
or biased to favor some
interpretations over others. For
instance, in the gavagai situation,
children, as well as adults, will tend
to take the word as naming the
entire object. They are not limited
to an object interpretation, however.
In other situations they can
entertain non-object interpretations
of a new word, which is a capacity
necessary in order to learn
adjectives (such as ‘white’), verbs
(such as ‘jumping’), and so on.
How is the problem solved?
There are several cognitive
systems that work together to make
word learning possible. Some of
these involve memory–word
learning and require the capacity to
encode, store, and access arbitrary
mappings; in this case, between
sounds (or signs) and meanings.
There are also conceptual
capacities. In order to learn words
for kinds of objects, properties, and
actions, say, the child has to have
some non-linguistic understanding
of what such words mean. One
reason why children will never
assume that gavagai means time-
slices of rabbit is because these are
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not natural hypotheses for a word
learner to entertain — while
categories like rabbit and animal are. 
A further system involves
children’s appreciation of the mental
states of other people, what is
sometimes called ‘naïve psychology’
or ‘theory of mind’. There is
abundant evidence that children
will take a word as referring to a
given object if and only if there is
evidence that the speaker intended
to refer to that object. If an 18-
month-old hears a novel label as she
is playing with a novel toy, she will
only assume that the word is a name
for the toy if the label is spoken by
someone who is also attending to
the toy. If she just hears a
disembodied voice naming the
object as she is looking at it (e.g. ‘A
dawnoo! There’s a dawnoo!’), the
word is not mapped onto that
object.)
Another study tested babies in a
context in which they were given
one object to play with while
another object was put into a bucket
that was in front of the
experimenter. When the baby was
looking at the object in front of her,
the experimenter looked at the
object in the bucket and said a new
word, such as ‘It’s a modi!’. 18-
month-olds looked at the
experimenter and redirected their
attention to what she was looking at,
in this case, at the object in the
bucket. And when later shown the
two objects and asked to ‘find the
modi’, children assume that the
word refers to the object the
experimenter was looking at when
she said the word — not the object
that the child herself was looking at. 
More sophisticated intentional
capacities are displayed by 24-
months olds. In one study, an adult
announced her intention to find an
object — ‘Let’s find the
toma!’ — and then picked up and
nonverbally rejected (by frowning)
two other objects before picking up
a third object and smiling. Despite
the temporal gap, children inferred
that this third object was what
‘toma’ referred to. In another study,
an adult used a novel verb to declare
her intention to perform an action
(e.g. ‘I am going to blork!’),
proceeded to do an action
‘accidentally’ (saying ‘Whoops!)
and then performed another action,
with satisfaction (saying ‘There!’
with a pleased expression).
Children connected the verb with
the action the speaker seemed
satisfied with, not the accidental
one. Such studies indicate that
young children infer the intention of
the speaker (through attention to
cues that include line-of-regard and
emotional indications of
satisfaction) when determining the
referent of a new word, for both
nouns and verbs.
Finally, even young children
attend to the syntax of a word when
determining what the word means.
The classic study showing this was
done by Roger Brown, who showed
preschoolers a picture of a strange
action being performed on a novel
substance using an unfamiliar
object. One group of children was
told ‘Do you know what a sib is? In
this picture, you can see a sib’
(count noun syntax), a second group
was told ‘Have you seen any sib? In
this picture, you can see sib’ (mass
noun syntax), and a third group was
told ‘Have you seen sibbing? In this
picture, you can see sibbing’ (verb
syntax). The preschoolers tended to
construe the count noun as referring
to the object, the mass noun as
referring to the substance, and the
verb as referring to the action.
Subsequent research has found that
syntactic cues can help children to
learn words belonging to a range of
different ontological categories, and
might play an especially important
role in how they learn the meanings
of abstract verbs such as ‘thinking’
and ‘receiving’. 
Research to date suggests that
children learn words through a set
of diverse capacities, including
memory, an appreciation of the
categories and individuals that make
up the external world, an
understanding of the beliefs and
intentions of other people, and a
sensitivity to syntax. An act as
seemingly simple as a 2-year-old
learning the word rabbit draws upon
many of the capacities that are
central to the human mind.
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